Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarun Agarwala, Sr. Judge (Right) administered the Oath of office to Hon’ble Mr. Justice Serveshe Kumar Gupta on 21.04.2011
CONTENTS

- Hon’ble Judges of Uttarakhand High Court 4
- From the Desk of Chief Justice. 5
- Transfer & Promotion of Judicial Officers. 6
- Institution, Disposal & Pendency of cases in High Court. 7
- Institution, Disposal & Pendency of cases in District Courts. 8
- Circular Letters (issued in the quarter) 9-10
- Some Recent Judgments of Uttarakhand High Court. 11-18
- Major Events and Initiatives. 19
- Major Activities of UJALA. 19
# UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT

## LIST OF JUDGES (As on 30<sup>th</sup> June, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SL. No.</th>
<th>Name of the Hon’ble Judge</th>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hon’ble Mr. Justice Barin Ghosh (Chief Justice)</td>
<td>12.08.2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarun Agarwala</td>
<td>25.09.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prafulla C. Pant</td>
<td>29.06.2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. S. Verma</td>
<td>15.07.2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.K. Bist</td>
<td>01.11.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia</td>
<td>01.11.2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Hon’ble Mr. Justice Servesh Kumar Gupta</td>
<td>21.04.2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MESSAGE

In my message dated April 06, 2011 published in the last newsletter, I invited all of you to share your experiences. You have not done so.

Let me share a small experience of mine while functioning as a Judge of this High Court. I had a case before me where an order taking cognizance was challenged under Section 482 of the Code. The order taking cognizance was passed on a complaint. The persons accused alleged to have committed crimes punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. I was surprised that the persons who gave dowry supported the complainant by giving oral evidence and while doing so positively asserted that they gave dowry and the same was taken by the accused persons. They were, however, not added as accused persons, nor the Court took cognizance of offence committed by them.

I would request all of you to share informations of this nature in order to expand our knowledge of working of the Courts. It is not necessary to give vivid particulars of the incidence so as to cast aspersions against any Court or any person, but to highlight the matters of importance.

As usual this quarterly newsletter, I hope, will bring forth all those informations in which people are interested.

Thank you,

June 30, 2011

(Barin Ghosh)
## TRANSFERS & PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS

*(in the quarter ending 30th June, 2011)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SL.NO.</th>
<th>Name of the Judicial Officer</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Date of Transfer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Smt. Manju Singh Munde, Civil Judge (J.D.)</td>
<td>Gangolihat</td>
<td>Civil Judge (J.D.), Pithoragarh</td>
<td>10.05.2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Smt. Jyotsna, Civil Judge (J.D.)</td>
<td>Champawat</td>
<td>Addl.Civil Judge (J.D.), Khatima</td>
<td>12.05.2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Smt. Anjushree Juyal, Civil Judge (Sr. Div.)</td>
<td>Bageshwar</td>
<td>Asstt. Sessions Judge [Civil Judge (Sr. Div.)]/8th F.T.C., Haldwani</td>
<td>13.05.2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Smt. Meena Tiwari, District &amp; Sessions Judge</td>
<td>Chamoli</td>
<td>District &amp; Sessions Judge, Nainital</td>
<td>24.06.2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Sri Ashish Naithani, 3rd Addl. District &amp; Sessions Judge</td>
<td>Udham Singh Nagar</td>
<td>District &amp; Sessions Judge, Chamoli</td>
<td>24.06.2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INSTITUTION, DISPOSAL AND PENDENCY OF CASES

HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND (from 01.04.2011 to 30.06.2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution (01.04.2011 to 30.06.2011)</th>
<th>Disposal (01.04.2011 to 30.06.2011)</th>
<th>Pendency (At the end of 31.03.2011)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Cases</td>
<td>Criminal Cases</td>
<td>Total Pendency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2132</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>3198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1642</td>
<td>1025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12705</td>
<td>6470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C.L. No. 04/UHC/Admin.A/2011

Subject: Regarding communications received by the District Judges from the High Court and other superior courts.

With reference to the subject noted above, I am directed to say that whenever any communication is received by the District Judge from the High Court and other superior courts and it pertains to any of the courts subordinate to him, the same shall be communicated to the court concerned without loss of time. The office of the District Judge shall enter the said communication in the register in Form No. 62, as directed under Rule 431 of General Rules (Civil) and shall also mention the date on which it has been transmitted to the court concerned. Likewise, every Presiding Officer incharge of a court of the Judgeship shall also maintain such a register to record therein what has been received from higher courts, the office of the District Judge or any other authority. Presiding Officers are directed to take notice of the entries made in course of the day in the register at the end of the day, to update themselves of the communications received by them from higher courts, the District Judge or any other authority.

You are therefore, requested to bring this Circular Letter to the notice of all the judicial officers posted under your administrative control for strict compliance.
Some Recent Judgments of Uttarakhand High Court

FULL BENCH JUDGMENTS:

1. On 7th April, 2011, a Full Bench in Director of Income Tax Vs. M/s Maersk Co. Ltd. (Income Tax Appeal No. 26-29 of 2009) considered the question “whether the assessee who became liable to pay the tax as it was not deducted at source also became liable to pay interest under Section 234B of the Income Tax Act?”

   The Bench, while answering the reference in negative observed that the payment of tax and interest have been separately dealt with under the Income Tax Act. Provisions relating to payment of tax and payment of interest operate in two different areas. If the tax has not been deducted at source, the liability is upon the assessee to pay directly as per Section 191 of the Act and upon failure to deduct the tax at source, the liability is upon the employer to pay interest under Section 201 (1A) of the Act. An assessee whose income is liable to be deducted at source is not liable to pay advance tax under Section 208 of the Act and consequently is not liable to pay interest under Section 234B of the Act. The Bench observed that in any case assessee and employer would not be jointly and severally liable to pay interest on the amount of tax, which was not deducted at source on the income by the employer.

2. On 10th May, 2011, a Full Bench in Ajay Goyal Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Others (Writ Petition P.I.L. No. 1018 of 2008) considered the question, namely, “Whether after the power to levy toll on motor vehicles by the Municipalities was expressly withdrawn, on the strength of Notification issued by the Cantonment Board prior to withdrawal of such power, the Cantonment Board can continue to collect toll on motor vehicles.”

   The Bench answered the reference in negative and observed that a tax can be imposed by the Cantonment Board pursuant to the law in force i.e. the Municipalities Act at the time of the issuance of the notification, but the amendments made in the Municipalities Act subsequently would also apply equally. The Bench laid emphasis on the word “for the time being in force” and observed that the word is crucial and can only mean not only to the law
in force at the time of the passing of the Municipalities Act but also to any law that is passed subsequently.

The Bench further observed when the provision relating to levy of tax on entry of vehicles was withdrawn by a notification in 1991, the Municipalities lost the power to levy toll tax on entry of vehicles from that date, as a result the statutory power under Section 60 of the Cantonments Act, being dependent and co-extensive with the power given under Section 128 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, was also lost and automatically withdrawn.

The Bench also dealt with the distinguishing aspect of legislation by incorporation and legislation by way of reference. The Full Bench observed that adaptation of a provision by a reference or citation or by incorporation is an accepted device of legislation. If the adapting Act refers to certain provisions of an earlier existing Act, it is known as legislation by reference but if the provisions of another Act are bodily lifted and incorporated in the new Act, it is known as legislation by incorporation.

DIVISION BENCH JUDGMENTS:

3. On 6th April, 2011, a Division Bench in Smt. Dr. Madhu Arya Vs. State of Uttarakhand and others (Writ Petition (S/B) No. 33 of 2011) (reported in 2011 (1) U.D. 292), while dealing with a matter regarding issuance of caste certificate, observed that in India there is only one domicile and each citizen of this country carries with him or her, one single domicile which is the “Domicile of India”. The concept of regional or provincial domicile is alien to Indian Legal system. Even the Constitution of India (Article 5) while explaining “citizenship” speaks of “domicile in the territory of India, and not in the territory of a “Province”.

The Bench also observed that provision, namely, Section 15 & 16 of the Indian Successions Act, relied upon by the concerned authority in rejecting the claim of the petitioner are inapplicable in this case, as these provisions form a part of Part II of the said Act and Section 4 of the said Act specifically states that this Part (Part II) shall not apply, if the deceased was a “Hindu, Mohammedan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina” and therefore Section 15 & 16 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 are not applicable in the case of a Hindu.
4. On 10th May, 2011, a Division Bench in *Nav Bhar Ali Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Others* (Special Appeal No. 207 of 2010), while allowing the special appeal against the Nagar Palika, Nainital concluded that in order to cause loss of Rs. 49 lacs to Nagar Palika, a few people associated with Nagar Palika created the things, and thereby committed cognizable offences. The Bench directed that the matter be investigated by Central Bureau of Investigation, Dehradun.

5. On 10th May, 2011, a Division Bench in *Aas Mohammad @ Aashu Vs. State of Uttarakhand* (now State of Uttarakhand) (Criminal Appeal No. 1843 of 2001), while allowing the appeal of accused/appellant, observed that The District Magistrate should have mentioned the explosive substance said to have been found from the possession of the accused on the basis of which it could be said that the sanction was required under Explosive Substance Act, 1908. The Bench also observed that The Explosive Substance Act, 1908, as it existed prior to amendment made in it vide Act No. 54 of 2001, there was no punishment extending to imprisonment for life provided in the Act. The incident in question relates to the year 1993. But the trial court in its wisdom has sentenced the accused/appellant Aas Mohammad @ Aashu to imprisonment for life under Section 4/5 of Explosive Substance Act, 1908, which cannot be upheld.

6. On 19th May, 2011, a Division Bench in *Nirmala Uniyal Vs. Ram Krishna Uniyal* (First Appeal No. 23 of 2011) reiterated the principle of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in *Kamala and others Vs. K.T. Eshwara Sa and others* [2008 (72) ALR 476] and held that where for deciding an issue relating to *res-judicata* evidence of the parties is required to be led, the plaint cannot be rejected under order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC. The Bench observed that since in the present case there was mixed question of fact and law involved, as such the rejection of plaint by the trial Court cannot be upheld.

the fact that for ten years there is no criminal case registered against the petitioner. As such, there is no justification to encroach upon the fundamental rights of the petitioner after the period of ten years particularly when he has been acquitted from all the criminal cases registered against him long back.

8. On 24th May, 2011, a Division Bench in *Divya Rajvanshi & another Vs. State of Uttarakhand* (writ petition (S/B) no. 222 of 2008) while observing that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, rendered in the case of *State of Punjab Vs. Manjit Singh AIR 2003 SC 4580*, has no application to the instant case, found that in the instant case, the respondent Commission was not conducting any screening test, instead it was conducting the final written examination in order to ascertain merit of candidates. In the matter of ascertaining such merit, it goes without saying that not only a benchmark can be fixed in law, the same is required to be fixed so that undesirable people, who do not have the basic knowledge to be tested in the examination, are not appointed only on the ground that others do not have better merit than them.

9. On 26th May, 2011, a Division Bench in *Matri Sadan Vs. Himalaya Stone Crusher Pvt. Ltd.* (Special Appeal No. 03 of 2011) sustained the order of the Government to close down the crusher while analyzing and examining the scope of the fundamental rights to every citizen to carry on the trade, profession and business of his choice as envisaged by Article 19 of the Indian Constitution by referring galaxy of cases rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Bench observed that it has almost now been settled that no inflexible answer can be offered as to what industry should be brought to the total prohibition and what not. There is no abstract or fixed principle, which laid the universal application in all cases where the closure of the trade and industry deserve to be enjoined. Each case is to be judged on its own merits. The Court must determine the reasonableness of restriction to be imposed for the closure of the trade or industry by objective standards and not by subjective ones.

The Bench also dealt with the aspect as enshrined under Article 48(A) and 51(A) of the Indian Constitution and observed that there is nothing wrong in order of the Government taking note of the changed circumstances and heavy protest from all the corners of the society against the creation of hazard by the crusher. The Bench observed that appellant has
resisted for running of this crusher in order to advance the duty cast upon the State by Article 51(a)(g) of the Constitution which envisages that it is the duty of every citizen of the India to protect and improve the National Environment including forests, lakes, rivers, wildlife and to have compassion for living creatures.

10. On 26th May, 2011, a Division Bench in Director, Indian Veterinary Research Institute (IVRI) Vs. Ashok Kumar (Special Appeal No. 78 of 2011) while dismissing the appeal observed that any order passed by a Court, whether interim or final, is binding on the parties to the lis, until the same is vacated or set aside. An order of a Court may be set aside by a superior Court. An interim order passed by a Court may also be vacated by the same Court. The Bench observed that the respective rights and liabilities of the parties under the interim orders continued to remain operative until the same was vacated.

11. On 13th June, 2011, a Division Bench in Virendra Singh Samant @ Rinku Vs. State of Uttarakhand (Criminal Jail Appeal No. 10 of 2007) while dismissing the appeal of appellant/accused after considering submission on behalf of accused regarding Test Identification Parade observed that the TIP in the present circumstances was not necessary inasmuch as all the prosecution witnesses (who were eye-witnesses) to the incident have stated that they knew the accused appellant and have stated that he was the one who stabbed the deceased.

The Bench also rejected the claim that it is a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and observed that the parameter to distinguish a case from culpable homicide not amounting to murder and murder are by now well-settled. It is also well settled that it is not the number of injuries but the quality of injury, which matters. Even if there is one single blow but if it is caused by a dangerous weapon on a vital part of the body and it causes death, it would be murder and not culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Bench observed that this is a law right from the decision of the Apex Court in Virsa Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465.

12. On 15th June, 2011, a Division Bench in State of Uttarakhand and Another Vs. Pitamber Datt Pandey and Others (Special Appeal No. 87 of 2011) while interpreting the question, as to whether the Chief Justice and the State Government in exercise of their power under
Article 229 of the Constitution of India, reduce the pay they had promised to pay to the employees of the High Court while exercising similar power on earlier occasion under Article 229 of the Constitution? The Bench answered in negative and observed that the Constitution of India itself provides that only when financial emergency has been proclaimed, salaries can be reduced, which, in other words, makes it clear that in any other circumstances, salary cannot be reduced. Therefore, even in exercise of power under Article 229 of the Constitution of India, the salary, already promised and paid in exercise of power under Article 229 of the Constitution of India, cannot be reduced.

SINGLE BENCH JUDGMENTS:


The Bench observed that the matter is matrimonial in which the parties have amicably settled the dispute outside the Court through compromise, and continuation of criminal proceedings arising out of the same, would not be in the interest of justice.

14. On 9th May, 2011, a Single Judge Bench in Mangey Ram and Another Vs. State of Uttarakhand (Criminal Misc. Application No. 386 of 2011) dismissed the application of applicants for considering the earlier bail bonds furnished by them along with sureties given in the case under sections 504, 506 of I.P.C. In this case at the time of cognizance, applicants were summoned and bailed out under section 504, 506 of I.P.C. Subsequent thereto, at the stage of charge, trial court held that the case is such that if found guilty, applicants/accused may be convicted under sections 420, 467, 468, 442 and 120-B of I.P.C. also. In this scenario of facts, applicants approached the Court with the prayer that order granting them interim bail be treated to cover the whole case.

The Bench observed “It is settled law that graveness of the allegations against the bail seeker is a very important aspect to be taken into account while dealing with an application
for bail. In the circumstances, since, now the applicants are facing graver charges, they would be required to seek fresh bail and the bail order earlier passed, bail bonds and securities furnished, pursuant to the said order, cannot be treated to be bail order, bail bonds and securities in respect of charges, now the applicants are facing.

15. On 9th May, 2011, a Single Judge Bench in *Amar Singh Bisht and Others Vs. State of Uttarakhand* (Criminal Misc. Application No. 345 of 2011), while considering the compromise in a matrimonial dispute, observed that when the Legislature has not permitted parties to compound offences, not mentioned in Section 320 of the Code and those mentioned in Section 8 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, no one is entitled to compound such offences and, accordingly, even if there is a compromise *inter se* the parties, the court could not permit compounding of such offences on the basis of compromise.

The Bench further observed, however for the purposes of upholding public order and dignity of society, the power of this Court under Section 482 of the Code is not circumscribed by what has been provided in Section 320 of the Code and Section 8 of the Act. The Bench observed that a family, which was on the verge of collapse, has re-united, which, in turn, is likely to bring in peace in the society and prosperity for the people at large. In the event, despite such effort made, parties are forced to be adversaries against each other in criminal proceedings, the same would disturb tranquility of the society and would be against public interest.

16. On 11th May, 2011, a Single Judge Bench in *Pankaj Gupta Vs. Prescribed Authority, Rishikesh* (Writ Petition (M/S) No. 491 of 2011) while placing reliance on the principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the case of *Chandan Rai Garg Vs. Prescribed Authority and others* [2010 (1) ARC, Page 166] held that if during pendency of suit, an application is filed by one of the heir, then he is entitled to be impleaded as a party. Under the general law after the death of his heirs inherit the tenancy even under U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, in case of non-residential building all the heirs of the tenant inherit the tenancy by virtue of the definition of tenant given under section 3(a) of the Act.

17. On 24th May, 2011, a Single Judge Bench in *Peter Succoro Vaz Vs. Karanjit Singh* (Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1856 of 2010) while allowing the Writ Petition observed that in view of
the judgment rendered by this Court in Writ Petition No. 336 of 2010(M/S) and as per provisions of Order 4-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, the trial court, should have considered the fact that the property in question in both the suits was the same, the parties to the suit were the same and that the evidence to be led in both the suits is similar, therefore, to avoid conflicting judgments in both the suits and in the interest of justice both the suits ought to have been consolidated together.

18. On 24\textsuperscript{th} May, 2011, a Single Judge Bench in \textit{Nasir Vs. State of Uttarakhand} (Criminal Revision No. 109 of 2011) held that it is settled principle of law that powers under section 319 of Cr.P.C. are to be exercised sparingly, and a third person should be summoned only when from all corners, the trial court is convinced that such person has complicity in the crime. If the power under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. is exercised in casual or routine manner, any witness by improving the case at the time of recording of evidence name anyone in commission of crime.

19. On 24\textsuperscript{th} May, 2011, a Single Judge Bench in \textit{Neeraj Dobhal and others Vs. State of Uttarakhand and others} (Writ Petition (S/S) No. 483 of 2011) while dismissing the writ petition observed that the principles of natural justice and fair play cannot be applied in every case. The principle of natural justice and fair play is not a “Bull in a China Shop” but in essence it is good conscience in governance. The Bench quoted the seminal judgment of Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in \textit{Mohinder Singh Gill and another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others} (1978) 1 SCC 405.

The Bench also observed that even though there may be such cases where due to inadvertence and for any other reasons the State might have selected or granted appointment to a candidate who had also violated such condition as the petitioners have done, even then this Court cannot grant the same relief to the petitioners as two wrongs do not make a right as has clearly been stated in a decision of Supreme Court in \textit{Directorate of Film Festivals and others Vs. Gaurav Ashwin Jain and others} (2007) 4 SCC 737.

***************
MAJOR EVENTS AND INITIATIVES

- **MEGA LOK ADALAT**: On 21.05.2011, a Mega Lok Adalat was organized in the High Court premises under the aegis of State Legal Services Authority and High Court Legal Services Committee. Total 36 cases were disposed of in the Mega Lok Adalat and Rs. 54,34,000/- compensation was awarded to the litigants.

- **DIRECTORY-2011**: Telephone directory for the year 2011 was published by the High Court. Directory contains amongst others all the important numbers of judicial institutions.

- **CIRCULAR LETTERS/ORDERS BOOK**: High Court of Uttarakhand has issued various circular letters/orders since its inception on 09.11.2000. These circulars contain directions/guidelines for the subordinate judiciary. High Court compiled all the circulars and published them in the form of a booklet to be used as a ready reckoner.

- **H.J.S. EXAMINATION-2011**: To fill-up the 06 vacancies of direct recruitment of H.J.S. cadre, a preliminary examination was conducted on 22nd May, 2011. Result of the preliminary examination was declared on the same day and 59 candidates were declared successful for the main examination. Main Examination has been conducted on 18th & 19th of June, 2011.

MAJOR ACTIVITIES OF UJALA

- **Workshop on “Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000” (from 06.04.2011 to 07.04.2011 and 21.05.2011 to 22.05.2011)**: A two days workshop was organized by the Academy for the members of Juvenile Justice Boards of Uttarakhand. Similar workshop was also organized for Principal Magistrates of Juvenile Justice Boards. 07 Principal Magistrates from various districts attended the workshop.

- **Refresher Training Programme (from 18.04.2011 to 03.05.2011)**: A 15 days refresher training programme was organized for Civil Judges (Jr. Div.) of the year 2008 batch. 12 Judges from various districts participated in the programme.

- **Workshop on “Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005” (from 07.05.2011 to 09.05.2011)**: A three days workshop was organized for the Judicial Magistrates dealing with the Act in the State of Uttarakhand. 16 Judicial Magistrates participated in the workshop.

- **Foundation Training Programme for the newly appointed Civil Judges (Jr. Div.) (from 01.06.2011 onwards)**: 07 Civil Judges (Jr. Div.) were recruited by the Public Service Commission. They were appointed in various districts of Uttarakhand and attached with working Judicial Officers for court training. Thereafter three months foundation-training programme has been organized for them. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Pratifulla C. Pant inaugurated the Foundation Training Programme on 01.06.2011. On 10.06.2011, the Former Chief Justice of India, Hon’ble Mr. Justice A.M. Ahmadi visited the Academy and interacted with the newly appointed Civil Judges (Jr. Div.).